Iran and Oman are reportedly close to agreement on a shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, The Malaysian Reserve reported on September 17 [2]. This is distinct from the postponed multilateral Iran-Gulf meeting and from Iran's stated refusal to talk with Washington; no outlet in the feed reports a deal concluded [2]. The discussion matters because a functioning corridor would change the insurance calculus that has kept commercial transit effectively impossible since February 2026.

Traffic data shows the strait remains lightly used but slightly less empty than recent days. Windward counted 12 strait transits on September 16, double the prior day's six, with three VLCCs (310m+) crossing dark and inbound in ballast via the southern corridor [1]. Tankers made up 80% of southern-corridor traffic that day [1]. MarineRadar recorded four crossings on September 16 and noted the US military told reporters the strait remained open and navigable, a position the tracking numbers have not supported [3].

The distinction between AIS transits and completed oil-cargo crossings remains critical. Only three of the 12 Windward-tracked vessels broadcast AIS for their full transit; two more switched it off mid-transit [1]. The inbound VLCCs were in ballast, meaning they were not carrying oil cargo southbound — any laden return trip has not been observed [1]. IMF PortWatch recorded 8 transits on September 13 against a pre-crisis baseline of 85 per day [2]. Brent stood at $104.07, down 1.40% over 24 hours as of 23:50 UTC September 17 [2].

Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority expanded its blacklist to 78 vessels (up from 77), 85% tankers, 40% Emirati-linked [1]. Two of six actively-transiting blacklisted vessels are assessed as most likely to cross the strait next [1]. Insurance-based closure remains operative [2]. Oil passage through Hormuz cannot be confirmed from these sources.